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COMPLY-AND-EXPLAIN: SHOULD 
DIRECTORS HAVE A DUTY TO INFORM? 
JOHN C. WILCOX* 
“Can we end the long tradition of the boardroom as a sealed chamber from 
which we issue only unanimous endorsements of management’s actions and 
results? Can we move toward more transparency about the boardroom process, 
without undermining the ability of management teams to produce the results 
that shareholders want?”1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
A new “Directors’ Duty to Inform” could be derived from the “Standards of 
Conduct for Directors” in section 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act 
(MBCA).2 To fulfill their duty to inform, directors of publicly held companies 
would be obligated to explain to shareholders how they are discharging their 
duties in a manner they “reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the 
corporation.”3 
A duty to inform would have five main objectives: 
1.  Explain the relationship between the board’s governance decisions 
and the company’s business goals; 
2.  Enable shareholders to make an informed evaluation of 
A.  the company’s governance, 
B.  the directors’ competence and independence, and 
C.  the board’s exercise of business judgment; 
3.  Enhance directors’ credibility through the articulation of 
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 1. Leon Panetta, It’s Not Just What You Do, It’s the Way You Do It, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, 
Winter 2003, at 17, 21. For a general discussion of the problems of board–shareholder communication 
at U.S. companies, see generally Symposium, Who Speaks for the Board?, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, 
Second Quarter 2010, at 18; COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS OF THE ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, 
REPORT ON THE ROLES OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS OF PUBLICLY OWNED 
CORPORATIONS, available at http://www.abanet.org/media/nosearch/task_force_report.pdf; see also 
Stefan Stern, Investors Want You to Tell a Better Story, FINANCIAL TIMES.COM (May 31, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c3bcd18e-6cdb-11df-91c8-00144feab49a.html. 
 2. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2008). 
 3. See id. § 8.30(c) (This section obliges directors to act in accordance with their reasonable beliefs 
about the best interests of the corporation, but it does not require that they communicate these beliefs 
to the shareholders). 
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A.  the processes by which board decisions are made, and 
B.  the strategic rationale for their decisions; 
4. Encourage customization, flexibility, and strategic focus in boards’ 
corporate governance practices comparable to the “comply or 
explain” approach used in principles-based governance systems; and 
5.  Promote dialogue and reduce confrontation between boards and 
shareholders. 
The substantive information provided by directors pursuant to a duty to 
inform would be company-specific, qualitative, contextual, and forward-
looking, thereby bringing it within the protection of the business judgment rule. 
The intent of the duty would not be to increase directors’ liability, but to 
increase their accountability to shareholders.4 
The duty could be discharged by means of a written annual “Directors’ 
Discussion and Analysis” or by periodic communications from board 
committees or the board chair to the shareholders. 
The expected long-term impact of a duty to inform would be to 
“operationalize” corporate governance policies and accustom boards to provide 
greater transparency about their deliberations and decisions on matters relating 
to governance, business oversight, and strategy. 
Regardless of whether a directors’ duty to inform can be inferred from the 
MBCA or other provisions of state law, it could be implemented through the 
adoption of a charter or bylaw amendment initiated by the board or by 
shareholders. 
II 
THE PROBLEM: SHAREHOLDERS NEED TO OBSERVE AND UNDERSTAND 
BOARD CONDUCT 
Nell Minow, editor and co-founder of The Corporate Library, has famously 
said: “[B]oards [of directors] are like subatomic particles—they behave 
differently when they are being observed . . . .”5 
The key words in Minow’s statement are “observed” and “behave.” From 
the perspective of long-term investors, corporate governance is primarily a 
means to observe and monitor the behavior of directors, who are the 
shareholders’ elected representatives, and to influence their behavior when 
necessary. The simple presumption behind most governance reforms is that 
directors will act with greater care and diligence when they are effectively 
monitored and accountable for their decisions. This presumption is a matter of 
human nature rather than law. 
 
 4. The liability for selective disclosure prohibited by Regulation FD under the Securities 
Exchange Act could be avoided by limiting the topics covered by a duty to inform. See the discussion in 
COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 1, at 11 n. 24. 
 5. The Prime of Ms. Nell Minow (A CFO Interview), CFO MAGAZINE, Mar. 2003, at 56, 62. 
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Given the goal of improved observation, a major governance dilemma arises 
because the boards of U.S. companies conduct their deliberations and make 
their decisions behind closed doors. Even though two decades of governance 
reforms have expanded companies’ disclosure requirements and amplified the 
duties and responsibilities of directors, boardroom windows at U.S. companies 
remain closed, with shades down and curtains drawn. 
Corporate advocates in the United States vigorously defend boardroom 
privacy on grounds of collegiality, competitiveness, independence, and respect 
for directors’ expertise and business judgment. However, boardroom secrecy 
and constraints on communication create problems: they can polarize relations 
between directors and shareholders, forestall dialogue, undermine trust, 
reinforce adversarial forms of engagement, and impose substantial costs on 
both companies and shareholders. For companies, the primary costs of board 
secrecy involve the time and resources boards must devote to formal 
compliance with governance rules, disclosure requirements, and shareholder 
engagements—not to mention the legal, lobbying, and public-relations 
dimensions of these activities. Shareholders, particularly institutional investors, 
incur comparable costs in their governance advocacy, monitoring of portfolio 
companies, engagement campaigns, activism, and promotion of shareholder 
rights—not to mention the losses incurred when poor governance practices 
cause the value of portfolio companies to decline. 
In addition to imposing these systemic costs, board secrecy and adversarial 
relations between companies and shareholders have contributed to the rise of a 
proliferating industry of corporate-governance experts, proxy-advisory firms, 
governance-rating entities, proxy solicitors, consultants, and intermediary 
service providers. The demand for the services of these firms has grown rapidly 
during the past two decades in parallel with increases in governance regulation 
and shareholder activism. At this point, there is every reason to think that the 
costs and resource demands associated with these activities will continue to 
grow in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the new Dodd-Frank regulatory 
regime.6 
Even though shareholders have achieved a largely unbroken record of 
success in promoting governance reforms, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
there is a limit to the effectiveness of prescriptive rules and external metrics. 
The financial crisis demonstrated all too clearly that compliance with rules and 
best practices does not ensure good governance. In some high-profile cases, 
companies’ full compliance with governance norms did little more than provide 
cover for weak board oversight, incompetence, and fraud. 
In this skeptical post-crisis environment, new strategies are needed to 
ensure that boards are not just compliant, but are implementing governance 
effectively. These strategies must come from within the boardroom. Although 
 
 6. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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shareholders will continue to demand greater transparency and accountability, 
a window into the boardroom can be opened only by the directors. Boards must 
act on their own initiative, not just in response to more disclosure requirements 
and governance rules. 
III 
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF THE DUTY TO INFORM 
A.  The Model Business Corporation Act 
The MBCA is a logical place to focus the search for the fundamentals of a 
directors’ duty to inform. Section 8.30 of the MBCA sets forth the “Standards 
of Conduct for Directors.”7 The operative language in section 8.30(a) states: 
“Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a 
director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”8 
The comment to section 8.30(a) explains: “The phrase ‘best interests of the 
corporation’ is key to an explication of a director’s duties. The term 
‘corporation’ is a surrogate for the business enterprise as well as a frame of 
reference encompassing the shareholder body.”9 
In essence, the MBCA confirms the common understanding that directors 
have a duty to act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. 
From both corporate and shareholder perspectives, the purpose of corporate 
governance should be to support this principle that aligns the interests of 
shareholders with the economic success of the business enterprise. 
The generic MBCA Standards of Conduct for Directors are supplemented 
by the language in section 8.30(c), which requires a director to “disclose . . . to 
the other board or committee members information not already known by them 
but known by the director to be material to the discharge of their decision-
making or oversight functions.”10 The comment describes this standard as “a 
duty of disclosure among directors.”11 
Although section 8.30(c) defines a limited reciprocal duty among board 
members, it could be recast to serve as a template for a directors’ duty to 
inform. Substitution of the word “shareholders” for the words “other board 
members” in section 8.30(c) would transform and broaden the duty to 
“encompass the shareholder body.” With this textual revision, the new version 
of section 8.30(c) would read as follows: “In discharging board or committee 
duties a director shall disclose, or cause to be disclosed, to the shareholders 
information not already known by them but known by the director to be 
 
 7. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2008). 
 8. Id. § 8.30(a) (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. § 8.30 cmt. 1 (emphasis added). 
 10. Id. § 8.30(c). 
 11. Id. § 8.30 cmt. 3. 
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material to the discharge of their decision-making or oversight functions . . . .” 
Under the revised language, the phrases “not already known by them” and 
“their decision-making or oversight functions” would refer to the shareholders 
rather than the directors. If Nell Minow’s observation is correct, this simple 
change of wording would effect a radical transformation in boardroom behavior 
by exposing directors’ decision-making to closer observation by shareholders. 
Corporate directors have not traditionally been responsible for determining 
what information is material to their shareholders’ “decision-making or 
oversight functions.” Disclosure requirements under federal and state law have 
led companies to focus on materiality with respect to shareholders’ investment 
decisions, not their administrative functions. Nevertheless, from the perspective 
of corporate governance, there are compelling reasons for expanding the 
board’s standards of conduct under section 8.30 to address the duties and 
responsibilities of shareholders that are analogous to those of corporate 
directors. 
Like corporate directors, many institutional investors, financial 
intermediaries, and other trustees are fiduciaries. Under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Department of Labor has long 
regarded the exercise of proxy votes as a fiduciary duty of pension trustees and 
their designated investment managers.12 As fiduciaries acting on behalf of 
beneficial owners, the “decision-making and oversight functions” of investors 
include voting proxies and electing the directors of portfolio companies. A 
persuasive argument can be made that in order to discharge their fiduciary duty 
to vote shares and elect directors in an informed manner, investors should have 
access to “material . . . information not already known to them” about the 
conduct of portfolio companies’ directors and their discharge of the duties set 
forth in section 8.30.13 A directors’ duty to inform would provide this 
information to shareholders. 
B.  The Corporate Director’s Guidebook 
The Corporate Director’s Guidebook, developed by the American Bar 
Association Committee on Corporate Laws, is another logical source for 
understanding and interpreting board duties.14 Section 3 of the Corporate 
Director’s Guidebook sets forth the “Responsibilities, Rights and Duties of a 
 
 12. Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Helmut Fandl, 
Chairman of the Ret. Bd. of Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), reprinted in COUNCIL OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT PROXY 
VOTING BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK 14–16 (2007), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/ 
resource%20center/publications/Proxy%20Voting%20Primer.pdf; see also Interpretive Bulletins 
Relating to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1994); 
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of 
Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2008). 
 13. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2008). 
 14. COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS OF THE ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, CORPORATE 
DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (5th ed. 2007). 
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Corporate Director.” Section 3.C.4 describes as one of the “legal obligations” of 
a corporate director a “duty of disclosure” that comes close to the concept of a 
duty to inform, but falls short in several ways.15 
Section 3.C.4 states: “As fiduciaries, directors have an obligation to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that shareholders are furnished with all relevant 
material information known to the directors when they present shareholders 
with a voting or investment decision.”16 The emphasized language limits the duty 
by aligning it with disclosure requirements that exist under federal securities 
laws and narrowing the context to situations that involve specific action by 
shareholders. It does not establish a general continuing duty to inform 
shareholders about board processes and conduct. 
Section 3.C.4 also mentions that some courts have expanded the board’s 
duty of disclosure beyond circumstances involving shareholder action: “[E]ven 
where the directors are not recommending shareholder action, they have a duty 
(independent of disclosure obligations generally under the federal securities 
laws) not to mislead or misinform shareholders.”17 This interpretation is helpful 
in its acknowledgement that the state law duty of disclosure is independent and 
separate from federal disclosure requirements. However, it describes the duty 
in negative terms as an obligation “not to mislead or misinform shareholders,” 
rather than asserting an affirmative duty to provide shareholders with 
information that is material to their evaluation of directors’ conduct and 
business judgment. 
Directors’ “disclosure” and “transparency” duties should be distinguished 
from the duty to inform in order to reinforce the qualitative differences in 
information communicated by a board at will rather than pursuant to a legal 
mandate. The duty to inform should not set limits, or dictate information that is 
deemed to be material, or mandate specific disclosures. Instead, the duty should 
encourage open communication in the form of a narrative that tells the story of 
a board’s decision-making processes and the strategic rationale for its choices in 
the context of the individual business enterprise. The substance of the narrative 
should be based on the judgment of the directors, not dictated by compliance 
requirements. 
C.  The U.K. Governance System: Comply-or-Explain 
By definition, a duty to inform would confer broad discretion on directors to 
explain how they discharge their duties in a manner they “reasonably believe to 
be in the best interests of the corporation.” The duty would introduce a do-it-
yourself dimension to boards’ corporate governance programs that would be 
largely voluntary and self-administered. The duty would not be administered by 
a regulator (as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates 
 
 15. See id. at 26. 
 16. Id. (emphasis added). 
 17. Id. 
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shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8).18 It would not be enforced by a self-
regulatory organization (SRO) (as the New York Stock Exchange enforces 
listed company standards with the threat of delisting).19 It would generally 
involve decisions protected by the business judgment rule and would therefore 
not be subject to the “Standards of Liability” defined in section 8.31 of the 
MBCA (although it would certainly be subject to federal and state antifraud 
provisions). In lieu of these traditional methods of oversight and enforcement, 
the duty to inform would be based on directors’ accountability to shareholders. 
The best-known model for accountability-based governance is the comply-
or-explain program that has been in operation in the United Kingdom for 
nearly two decades.20 Although not without its critics, the United Kingdom’s 
voluntary comply-or-explain governance regime offers a number of advantages 
for companies. Comply-or-explain is specifically designed to promote flexible 
and customized governance practices rather than prescriptive rules and check-
the-box compliance. It gives deference to the knowledge, expertise, and 
judgment of corporate directors. It assumes that boards are best positioned to 
determine what specific information is relevant to an explanation of non-
compliance. It assumes that directors will be candid and avoid boilerplate. Most 
importantly (and perhaps aspirationally), it assumes that institutional investors 
will be diligent in committing time and resources to evaluate the quality of a 
company’s governance decisions in the context of business strategy and 
financial performance. 
The U.K. Corporate Governance Code does not explicitly define a 
directors’ duty to inform, but it mandates an open relationship and constructive 
dialogue between directors and shareholders. Section E of the U.K. Code states 
the following “Main Principle”: “There should be a dialogue with shareholders 
based on the mutual understanding of objectives. The board as a whole has 
responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes 
place.”21 The important principle at the heart of the U.K. Code is that the board 
itself must assume responsibility for dialogue with shareholders, rather than 
vice versa. This approach is in contrast with U.S. practice, which discourages 
communication from boards to shareholders and encourages shareholders to 
initiate dialogue, usually through adversarial forms of engagement.22 
 
 18. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). 
 19. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 802.1D (2009), available at http:// 
nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/. 
 20. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE U.K. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2010), available 
at www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/Corporate_Governance/UK%20Corp%20Gov%20Code 
%20June%202010.pdf [hereinafter U.K. CODE]; see also James Hamilton, UK Reaffirms Comply or 
Explain Model for Corporate Governance as Financial Crisis Roils, CCH FINANCIAL REFORM NEWS 
CENTER (Aug. 28, 2009), http://financialreform.wolterskluwerlb.com/2009/08/uk-reaffirms-comply-or-
explain-model-for-corporate-governance-as-financial-crisis-roils.html (“The comply or explain 
approach has been in operation since the Code’s beginnings in 1992 . . . and the flexibility it offers is 
valued by company boards and by investors in pursuing better corporate governance.”). 
 21. U.K. CODE, supra note 20, § E.1, at 25. 
 22. See Symposium, Who Speaks for the Board?, supra note 1. 
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The U.K. Code’s provision E.1.2 further requires: “The board should state 
in the annual report the steps they have taken to ensure that the members of 
the board, and, in particular, the non-executive directors, develop an 
understanding of the views of major shareholders about the company . . . .”23 
Again, the point is that with U.K. companies, the board has a direct role in 
outreach and dialogue with major shareholders in order to understand their 
views. 
IV 
COMPLY-AND-EXPLAIN: A HYBRID GOVERNANCE PROPOSAL 
A directors’ duty to inform modeled on the United Kingdom’s principles-
based, comply-or-explain system would pose challenges for U.S. companies. It 
is unclear whether state law could accommodate a board duty defined with such 
broad discretion and enforced primarily by means of shareholder 
accountability. Such a duty would occupy uncharted middle ground between the 
Standards of Conduct for Directors under section 8.30 of the MBCA and the 
Standards of Liability under section 8.31 of the MBCA. It is equally unclear 
whether the U.S. rules-based system of corporate governance could tolerate a 
principles-based, discretionary approach to directors’ duties and standards of 
conduct. 
The success of a hybrid comply-and-explain governance system—grafting a 
new duty to inform onto the existing state and federal regulatory structure—
would depend on two developments that are highly uncertain: (1) directors of 
U.S. companies would have to overcome their habitual antipathy to 
shareholders, assume a less-defensive posture, and accept primary responsibility 
for dealing with shareholder concerns related to governance and board conduct; 
and (2) institutional investors would have to give priority to their 
responsibilities as long-term owners, commit resources to the oversight of 
portfolio companies, and reduce their dependence on standardized third party 
governance analyses and proxy-voting recommendations. 
In addition to these legal, structural, and cultural problems, the directors’ 
duty to inform would be likely to encounter resistance from U.S. companies and 
directors already overwhelmed by compliance requirements and facing 
additional controversial governance pressures including: the majority-vote 
standard in director elections, shareholder access, say-on-pay, risk oversight, 
takeover threats, conflicts of interest, short-termism, empty voting, proxy 
mechanics, environmental and social policies, and financial-system reform. 
Ironically, the imposition of a directors’ duty to inform could actually help 
companies anticipate and avoid many of these contentious issues. A board-level 
narrative describing the decision-making process and explaining the context and 
business rationale for board decisions would help defuse shareholder concerns, 
 
 23. U.K. CODE, supra note 20, § E.1.2, at 25. 
WILCOX 12/26/2010   
Winter 2011] COMPLY-AND-EXPLAIN 157 
reduce confrontation, and ultimately strengthen shareholder support even when 
there is a perception of non-compliance. 
Executive compensation is a useful example that reveals the limits of 
disclosure rules and the need for better communication about board processes 
and policies. The say-on-pay movement grew out of shareholder frustration not 
only with perceived compensation excesses, but also with standardized 
disclosures that failed to address important strategic questions.24 The goal of an 
advisory vote is not to micromanage compensation but to increase board 
accountability and thereby compel directors to align pay with performance and 
explain how their compensation policies support business strategy and value 
creation. Through the exercise of a duty inform, directors would have greater 
discretion to provide a comprehensive Board Compensation Committee Report 
explaining their compensation philosophy, their decisions with respect to bonus 
and variable pay, and the economic goals that the incentives are designed to 
achieve. 
This approach would be more effective than attempting to shoehorn the 
board’s views into the disclosure matrix of the management Compensation 
Disclosure and Analysis, or waiting to be targeted by shareholders and 
producing an explanation of directors’ policies and decisions after-the-fact. 
V 
TOWARDS RECIPROCITY: AN INVESTORS’ DUTY TO INFORM? 
Imposition of a directors’ duty to inform would not by itself result in “a 
dialogue with shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives.”25 
Opening boardroom windows would help, but for interests to be fully aligned, 
institutional investors must also agree to comparable standards of candor and 
openness. Constructive dialogue between boards and shareholders must be a 
two-way street. 
Debate over the Dodd-Frank bill launched a discussion of investor 
responsibility and fiduciary duty in the context of the abuses, conflicts of 
interest, and governance failures within the financial community that led to the 
crisis. As financial-system reform unfolds in the United States under the new 
law, many experts believe that institutional investors will replace companies and 
directors at the center of the governance-reform spotlight.26 Indeed, on October 
21, 2010, the United States Department of Labor announced a proposed rule 
 
 24. See, e.g., TIAA-CREF, 10 QUESTIONS FOR EVALUATING CD&A’S (July 2007), available at 
http://www.shareholderforum.com/op/Library/20070822_TIAA-CREF.pdf. 
 25. U.K. CODE, supra note 20, § E.1, at 25. 
 26. For further discussion on the evolving role of investors, see generally the recent publications of 
BOGLE FIN. MKTS. RESEARCH CTR., www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/bogle_home.html; see also John C. 
Bogle, Founder & Former Chairman, Vanguard Grp., Building a Fiduciary Society Remarks at the IA 
Compliance Summit (Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/ 
sp20090313.html. 
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that would substantially strengthen the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) definition of a “fiduciary.”27 More reforms are sure to follow. 
Discussion of investor responsibility is already well under way in the United 
Kingdom, where the Financial Reporting Council adopted a Stewardship Code 
for institutional investors in July 2010.28 It was preceded by an earlier Code on 
the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors, drafted in November 2009 by the 
Institutional Shareholders Committee, a forum representing major U.K. 
institutional investors.29 
These efforts may prove useful as a precedent for a U.S. private-sector 
initiative bringing together both corporate and investor representatives to deal 
with the conjoined issues of board and investor conduct. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Well before the financial crisis, Leon Panetta suggested that companies 
should open the “sealed chamber” of the boardroom and provide greater 
transparency about board processes. Instead, boardroom windows remained 
closed and U.S. governance continued to pursue its traditional course of 
confrontation, legislation, and rule-making.30 Now, as companies stagger under 
the burden of compliance and face additional governance challenges in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, directors should seriously consider whether their sealed 
chamber is a privilege or a constraint and whether its growing costs outweigh its 
diminishing benefits. 
The recent turmoil in the economy and financial markets underscores the 
importance of corporate governance and directors’ accountability to 
shareholders. However, in the United States, there is currently no basis for 
establishing a directors’ duty to inform shareholders about boardroom 
deliberations and governance decisions. 
Section 8.30 of the MBCA requires directors to act in the best interest of the 
company and establishes a duty to inform other board members of information 
material to their decision-making function, yet it stops short of applying that 
standard to shareholders and investors. The Corporate Director’s Guidebook 
limits directors’ affirmative duty to inform shareholders in situations involving 
specific actions. The U.K. Code presents a more open model of communication 
under the voluntary comply-or-explain system, fostering flexibility and 
deference to business judgment. However, by requiring explanation primarily 
 
 27. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263 (proposed Oct. 21, 2010) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
 28. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE (2010), available at 
www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/UK Stewardship Code July 20103.pdf. 
 29. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDERS COMM., CODE ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS (2009), available at http://institutionalshareholderscommittee.org.uk/sitebuildercontent/ 
sitebuilderfiles/ISCCode161109.pdf. 
 30. Panetta, supra note 1, at 21. 
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when the board chooses not to comply, the U.K. Code still presents a level of 
communication short of the ideal.  
A new duty to inform based on the principles of comply-and-explain would 
encourage directors of U.S. companies to articulate how decisions made in the 
boardroom advance strategic goals and align with shareholder interests. It 
would preserve directors’ discretion in the exercise of business judgment while 
providing shareholders with greater understanding of board conduct. In 
Panetta’s words, a directors’ duty to inform would “move toward more 
transparency about the boardroom process without undermining the ability of 
management teams to produce the results that shareholders want.”31 
Under a comply-and-explain system, directors would have to overcome the 
inertia of a traditionally opaque and defensive posture, while investors would 
be under an obligation to embrace their oversight function and use their voice 
and votes to hold directors accountable. If directors and shareholders would 
both commit to such reciprocal duties, improvements in transparency, 
accountability, and corporate stability would surely result. 
 
 
 31. Id. 
